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Since the literature on studies of studies is not rich, it appeared that to achieve 
any attempt at a rounded viewpoint another base was necessary. For the last 
twenty years I have worked in a school of public health, an area practicing 
intervention long before I came on the scene. However, my entry as a psychol- 
ogist and the hiring of many colleagues from the social sciences came about, 
seemingly, as a result of a shift in relationships between health professionals and 
their publics. Apparently as an aftermath of the Great Depression and the Roose- 
velt Revolution, members of the public were unwilling to accept commands 
from experts. At any rate, we were asked to give courses in how to reach the 
unreached, on the social bases of health behavior, and in general on how to 
entice people into health programs. This is an interesting sequel to the rise of 
organized public health activities associated with the social ferment around 1850. 
I mention this not only for whatever interest it may have, but also as a warning 
concerning the levels of certainty of much of what I have to say, which will be 
much like that above, to be taken with much salt. I am not operating on bedrock 
or with mathematical generalizations of well-founded data. Nonetheless, there 
is a rich body of experience and lore that can be useful as caution and hypothesis, 
and Thucydides’ statement about the utility of history may well apply. Many 
things that have happened may recur, but often they shouldn’t. 
What I am dealing with is the social process involved among practitioner, 
research worker, and a public in the course of studying intervention. It could 
be recast into the form of Holmes or Mead, discussing their perceptions of our 
perceptions of their perceptions because it does involve the peculiarities of 
looking over one’s own shoulder. I am sorry that I can’t give a page of structural 
equations involving these game theoretic feedback processes and I have not 
included a one-page systems diagram, although I don’t apologize too heartily. 
My favorite null model of cooperative unhelpful intervention is that of two 
people at both ends of a two-way switch system. As one is about to turn on the 
light, the other responds by also flipping his switch, and we have a vivid reali- 
zation of the equation 1 + 1 = 0. I have not analyzed this in detail nor extended 
it to the three-party situations we are considering. This is a complex process 
involving a high degree of self-consciousness about others. Even theologians 
have trouble with this, and we are far from a theory of involvement. If I can 
intervene in your thinking and thus contribute to successful intervention, I 
would be happy in the conviction that you had contributed to their happiness. 
Much of what I say is personal experience, and I hope it isn’t overly hortatory. 
This, however, is another one of the dangers of intervention. If you are repelled 
by it, try to turn it to account by not getting caught doing it yourself. 
Recently, studies of medical practice, which is intervention of the first order, 
have indicated problems that are worthy of note. Many of these problems arose 
because the intervention was considered to be purely biological, and this may 
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be an initial warning: social problems do not come in academic departmental 
packets. Psychologists need to remember that people have to  earn a living, just 
as other social scientists have to consider that demand is not ad hoc and that 
people adjust to unmet need, so that insured services are not immediately de- 
manded.l Among the problems of the patient-physician relation is the translation 
of the technicalities of medicine into lay language. It is not always done well. 
Numerous violations of instructions concerning patient behavior have been 
documented, and the key here appears to be an explanation of why a recom- 
mendation is made.2 It was found that patients learned more about their heart 
conditions from newspaper accounts of a President than from their own physi- 
cians.3 Mutual understanding may not be sufficient for easy social relations, 
but they do  appear necessary. To sharpen the parallel, let me ask about the 
questions in “research instruments” that depend on rare vocabulary or are other- 
wise unclear, and indicate the difficulty in using “scales” developed from college 
students for other  population^.^ A foolish answer to a foolish question should 
not be used to so code a respondent. Attempting to understand our fellow social 
scientists’ explanations of poverty, delinquency, and other phenomena in which 
we wish to intervene will give us a clue to others, and to the rich diversity of 
human activity. 
From here it is a short step to what appears to be the greatest problem in 
evaluation work in public health, with numerous ramifications that can entrap 
anyone. This is the fact that they, like all social interventionists from Lady 
Bountiful to Lyndon Johnson, are doing good; they are helping people. This 
makes it difficult to find out exactly what is being done and requires the highest 
degree of imaginative skill in hypothesization to develop the possible bases of 
evaluation by the subjects. An objective may be good and a procedure horrible, 
and what is sauce for the goose may or may not be sauce for the gander, but 
may well not be for sheep or goats. It is a commonplace among social scientists 
that ours is a pluralistic society with diffe,rentiated persons, but it is a common- 
place of politicians and other practitioners that all Americans have common 
values. It is, however, difficult to devise testable hypotheses about liberty, justice, 
and motherhood. The assumption of a common good is so general and so noxious 
that perhaps the Golden Rule itself needs restatement. Certainly this is one of 
the complaints of blacks against white education, white English, and white inter- 
vention altogether. 
Since this is very general, I will illustrate the specific effects on research from 
a study we did on a tuberculosis x-ray program.5 The very natistic was in 
question, and still unanswered issues of nonlinearities in measurement were 
raised. Chest x-rays are taken for the purpose of detecting undiscovered tubes- 
culosis, but an outcome measure of years of extended life is too costly to be used 
and even case findings come late. And, as any learning paradigm indicates, the 
cue becomes derivatively valued. Just as column-inches in newspapers become 
a measure of health education, independent of readership or influence, so the 
number of x-rays becomes a measure of program success independent of findings 
or effect. Now there is epidemiological evidence that the case-finding rate in- 
creases with depth of penetration, i.e., the greater the proportion of a population 
x-rayed the higher the case rate, which is quite in accord with the fact that 
penetration is inversely related to status. It is traditional to start a campaign 
with the mayor, and it is seldom that the last wino is gotten. Therefore, from a 
basis much nearer the benefit, the x-rays should be weighted as some direct 
function of the order obtained. Leaving such fine points of genuine validation 
Metzner: Interaction of Research and Subjects 51 
aside, however, what we found was that although a target population was defined 
and the estimated number used as denominator, the numerator was all x-rays 
taken on people in or out of the defined population. In the ensuing argument, 
which was lengthy and based on the presumed equal value of every film taken, 
we found that we were arguing with a United States Public Health Service manual. 
Meanwhile, x-rays were pursued hither and yon. Agreement on objectives between 
practitioners and reseqrch people is important, and difficult, with the populace 
as bystanders, but they are affected. 
Another related factor under the same heading of hidden assumptions, in the 
same study, concerned the procedures of “community organization.” This was 
a social science model and, therefore, not to be questioned. However, both words 
may be questioned and the phrase is somewhat self-contradictory. If a community 
exists, it will possess organization, and the procedure is more nearly that of 
community mobilization, bending it to our purpose; the problem is to find the 
organization gatekeepers. If we search, we find, but if we look in the dark we 
stumble over things rather than discover, demonstrate, or document them. Com- 
munity leaders can always be found, particularly if we ask those who might be. 
But who is following? Note that we are now, possibly, being blinded by our own 
view. It is very difficult to get and keep the subjects in mind, particularly when 
doing good. 
Note also that when a social situation is deemed to demand intervention, there 
is an implication of things not working according to plan or belief. Functionalist 
doctrine does not work on dysfunctional situations. There is very likely to be 
some detachment of the group needing the special help called intervention. 
Whether this attains all of the properties associated with alienation is another 
matter, but when a social structure crumbles, as with steel, neat theories of 
crystallization must give way to hypotheses concerning flaws. When the economic 
system is not producing higher wages but unemployment, and when the political 
system does not redress the problems, industrial leaders and elected officials 
may not be the key to the organization of those with whom or on whom we want 
to work. If they trust anyone it may be deviants corresponding to their deviation. 
Suffice it to say that the leaders found in the rather non-community in which 
the x-ray program was conducted did not produce crowding at the machines, 
and those they did lead into the vans were likely to have had other x-rays 
previously. 
The tuberculosis x-ray campaigns have now been dropped, since the benefits 
of treated cases may not outweigh the risk involved in exposure to x-rays. Herein 
lies a real warning concerning possible untoward effects of intervention and 
the difficulty of finding unalloyed goods. Unstudied side-effects can be as dis- 
astrous socially as they are with drugs. In fact, the calls for social intervention 
today are frequently in regard to the effects of yesterday’s cures. 
Another pair of assumptions hit me low blows personally in another study, of 
public response to peacetime uses of atomic energy.6 One was technical and con- 
erned the structure of our questionnaire. With reasonably developed theory, the 
funnel structure assumes a coherent subject matter approached in Aristotelian 
fashion through its genus, thus defining the subject in the process of questioning 
and securing the benefits of beginning with easy generality and developing rem- 
iniscence before getting into the sticky details. At that time, atomic energy had little 
coherence for the general public; indeed, a little thought indicated it had little 
for all nonphysicist professionals involved. Again, neat reliance on usual pro- 
cedures did not work for the unusual. We generated a new generalization: the 
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structure of the interview had to correspond to the structure of thought of the 
respondents. Again, our public changed us in time to be able to reflect their views 
more clearly. 
One little related point should perhaps be emphasized. Initially, it was difficult 
to get people to discuss peacetime uses of atomic energy because the bomb 
intruded. As good professionals, we were able to circumvent this by a “drainage” 
question and pursue our course to what the Atomic Energy Commission was 
interested in. This time we didn’t pick up the voice of the people. Nonintervention 
has its moral qualities, too. Sins, like statistical errors, are dichotomized into the 
classes of omission and commission. I should add here that a similar problem 
arises in the health field. People persist in telling us how illness hurts and disrupts 
their lives when we’re trying to seek out diagnoses and services. True, we hope 
that our findings will shorten the hurt and lessen the disruption, but occasionally 
on a dark night the thought arises that this objectivity carried over into interven- 
tion is the problem. The bureaucratization of social relations is one of the things 
that hurts. This approach could keep us in business forever, unless those being 
intervened upon decide to intervene. 
The second major, i.e., technical, issue in this study reminded us of the relativity 
of terms. As a social psychologist I pride myself on knowing how the various other 
aliquots live and think. I may know more than many; nevertheless, I occasionally 
learn-the hard way. Obviously, we were concerned with the dangers of atomic 
energy. I was not prepared by desk work, and at that time I didn’t know as much 
about industrial accidents to have respondents, fortunately in a pretest, tell me 
that the place they worked in blew up about every six months. We say that our 
students or our colleagues blow up from time to time, but this does not really 
give us scale points within which to place many industrial workers’ views of 
relative danger. If they say atomic energy isn’t very dangerous to work with, what 
does it mean in willingness to work and lost lives? 
Recently, research itself has come into question in many ways. Certainly, the 
numbers of persons following people around on Indian reservations and in ghettos 
may well raise issues. Placing a new reservoir over an old cemetery, or rehabili- 
tating Navahos to sit on chairs but not ride, is not viewed as improvement.? Telling 
people to do things they cannot possibly accomplish because of time, money, or 
distance barriers is grossly ineffective. These are just the results of ignorance, 
although they do not lead to bliss. Much worse is the callousness of older studies, 
now written up in the newspapers, using persons of low status as guinea pigs. 
There is resentment at being pawed over as “teaching material.” A ghetto research 
institute is not now considered local progress. We have a legacy to contend with 
that we have to deal with and should not contribute to. And it is not just our 
morals that need looking at. It is difficult to foresee effects or anticipate needs. 
Recently, the prize case, made the news again, although again we depend on 
journalists or discussions and mimeographed statements rather than research 
reports for our information. I refer to the intervention in Mound Bayou, Missis- 
sippi, to establish a health center, beginning with maternal and child health care 
services.8 The well-intentioned team was not prepared to find that hunger was 
the big problem, and that while there were many health problems, food was more 
important than medicine. Fortunately, the group coming in learned fast, and 
reoriented, but the consequent local control of the project is, as I read it, what 
is now causing the trouble. Whose criteria of success do we use, those of the 
intervenors or of their public? That they may well be different, I have tried to 
indicate above. In poverty programs, is success to be judged by quiet in the ghetto 
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or by increased pressure from the subjects, or by what and by whom? These are 
metaresearch questions and they predetermine the results. 
Thus far, I have tried to raise the larger questions of approach and of design 
that can determine whether an entire project fails or has some chance of success, 
socially and intellectually. Many of these issues are associated with the views held 
by researchers about the subjects (and vice versa) and their correctness as a basis 
for operating and interacting. Within the tripartite relators, however, there is 
another source of difficulty in relations between operating personnel and research 
persons. The practitioners are trying to get something done, and the researchers 
to study or document what is being done. There are plenty of opportunities for 
misunderstanding and cross-purposes, particularly because these two groups have 
different social functions. If scientists and humanists be two subcultures, prac- 
titioners are a third. Within psychology, the difficulties of accommodating research 
and clinical psychology may form a base for understanding the misunderstandings. 
Certainly we can share goals, but we also get in one another’s way. The researcher 
wants to take time to do a good job, the practitioners to get something done; and 
timetables can be a terror. Is it necessary to do a preliminary study to get a base 
line? To get precise measures, yes; but is this the objective, or improvement of the 
situation? Subjects are prone to side with practice; they want their obvious needs 
met. It really does not require an elaborate study to determine gross need, but it 
may well require some effort at quantitative data to determine whether what was 
done made a difference. What is done may not correspond to objectives established 
in planning. Feasibility is a key word with operators. It even determines many 
research sites and subjects, although we prefer to believe that scientists are more 
principled. The best that I’ve been able to achieve so far in developing a model 
of this is in statistical terms, which do have research implications. Scientists 
typically operate on low risk levels for Type I errors; we don’t want to be found 
wrong. Practitioners take greater risks; they want to be right. When they know 
of it, they prefer to minimize Type I1 errors. Omission is a greater problem for 
them than commission. If you finally work something out, the false starts will be 
forgotten. Aside from making the real value differences underlying this more 
apparent, I would like to suggest a compromise we may make that may well be 
more nearly optimal for the total process. Perhaps in this type of research we 
might relax our stringent alpha level to ten percent or so, in the interest of not 
missing promising leads. In a practical situation, it is not statistical significance 
that should be the guiding principle, but the reduction in total variance. How well 
we really understand what is going on, totally, is more important than whether 
we are very certain we’ve explained what may well be a tiny piece. This is a small 
contribution to what we need badly, a theory of practice, but it may stimulate 
someone to work further. 
I am assuming that the operating people and the research personnel are distinct. 
Although personality theory isn’t up to proving it, I think the roles with differing 
values are too distinct for easy incorporation into one person, and what is said of 
the lawyer who argues his own case or the physician who treats himself may be 
true here, too. 
Numerous problems other than timetables can arise. It is sometimes very 
difficult to find out in specific terms what the practitioners are going to do. The 
successful, which may not be the same as the good, administrator prefers not to 
commit himself to a precise course of action because he is very aware of the trial 
and error process involved. He will handle the problem; he will do what is neces- 
sary. This does not make for a neat set of hypotheses, except as a complex process 
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model. Perhaps we have to achieve this; it appears necessary to understand 
medical practice, and it may be intrinsic to practice in general. Teaching appears 
to be like this: there is no one superior way, but we must be prepared to try what 
fits the students and this may differ among students. All of this may look like, 
and sometimes it is, a case of saying one thing and doing another. And here we 
are trying to pin the man down. He may have a number of schemes up his sleeve 
to try, and we want a neat experimental design to fit our statistical procedures. 
We may have to adopt multiple working hypotheses and incorporate them in a 
more complex, branched decision model which uses conditional probabilities 
from observation and feed back from subjects rather than a factorial imposition 
of all procedures on all known kinds of subjects. The sukject may say, “It still 
hurts, Doc,” and good data on the inefficacy of the treatment are not satisfactory 
to him however valuable they may be. Unexpected or adventitious results may 
be satisfactory but very difficult to account for. Hawthorne and placebo effects 
are well known, and the very efforts we make to accommodate to and understand 
the practitioner may introduce effects for which double-blind procedures are 
necessary in medicine. We may try to understand, but we cannot get overly sym- 
pathetic. Note that every degree of independence on our part is a threat to the 
practitioner, since we are checking him. This is a tough, subtle, and delicate 
relationship. It can well involve the subjects who try to get us on their side, We 
become ombudsmen or political commissars or grievance agents, and trying to 
explain ourselves to subjects as information processors is difficult because it is 
unsatisfactory to them. Again, an optimum balance requires a quantitative model, 
which I do not have. A qualitative outline may, however, keep us from the 
extremes, which may be disastrous, but we also must keep from oscillating as we 
well might with high risks, high uncertainty, and highly amplified feedback. 
There is a third set of considerations that I pass over lightly, since the literature 
on direct interaction with subjects is reviewed as interviewing problems, although 
not presented as quantitative models either.9 Here again, however, our assump- 
tions and prejudices come into play. Subjects and respondents can sense, and do 
respond to, condescending or other attitudes. From the general-how can people 
live this way?-to the more specific-they must be ashamed to tell me their 
income-we establish conditions for self-fulfilling prophecies. Compliance is the 
great enemy of truth in interviewing. Any hint about what we want, any departure 
from complete permissiveness and acceptance is a clue that may condition the 
response. Of course, in more extreme cases we do not get submissive compliance; 
we may get no answers or evasions, or we may be thrown out. How the research 
is presented is quite important. The auspices can be critical, if meaningful, 
although our agency is totally unknown to the subject more frequently than we 
like to think. However, promises to help people are dangerous, if impelling, 
motives. Ghetto residents are no longer so sure the promises have been fulfilled 
sufficiently to constitute continuing premises. But we are a presence to the sub- 
jects, and what we represent to them may make a difference, and this can vary 
from being seen as representatives of the establishment, to nosy busybodies, to 
sympathetic listeners and communicators. We may not be overly helpful, but we 
can establish a useful and valuable role, if we explain ourselves honestly and 
devote ourselves seriously to the needs and satisfactions of the subject. 
Finally, I cannot help recalling, although I do not intend to dwell on them in 
the way we have to live with them, certain general long-term effects of research 
on our subjects. We, in the sense of the scientific investigators with whom we 
would like to identify, have interacted with our subjects with notable effect. At 
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first, people were fearful of the profound, mysterious and powerful phenomena 
that were investigated and of results challenging their beliefs. Later, a hopeful 
and trusting people supported research on the basis of its accomplishments for 
them. Now, there is renewed doubt and distrust as unforeseen and unwanted 
effects become apparent. As we work on these and wish to share in the credit for 
old accomplishments we must accept some of the blame a!so, and so act. It is 
toward this heightened awareness of the conditions and responsibilties of inter- 
vention that I have tried to direct myself and all of you. 
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DISCUSSION 
DR. IVERSON: Dr. Bunker regarded experimental research as a second level of 
investigation. I’m not quite sure where you would put experimental research. 
DR. METZNER: I think experimental design is fundamental to doing any kind 
of research. The process of validating our conclusions that is embodied in this is, 
I think, a paradigm that we have to follow to a great extent, and there are dangers 
in departing from it. What I did want to call attention to are the difficulties of 
implementing it, which I think are also great. 
DR. IVERSON: And to be aware of those difficulties. 
DR. METZNER: Occasionally, we have to substitute caution in conclusion for 
rigor in logic. 
